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IMPLICIT APPROVAL OF INCIDENTAL INTERCEPTION UNDER

TITLE III

United States v. Masciarelli
Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968' represents a Congressional attempt to provide an effective
means of controlling crime by the use of wiretapping and electronic
surveillance while insuring that individual privacy is safeguarded.'
The provisions of Title III generally prohibit the nonconsensual interception of private communications except where it is undertaken3
in connection with the investigation of certain designated offenses.
Basic to the statutory scheme is a provision requiring prior judicial
authorization of such interceptions, which may be obtained only
upon a showing that there exists probable cause to believe that one
of the specified crimes has been or will be committed.4 As an excep18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2

S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

I has as its dual purpose (1) protecting the
privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may
be authorized."
I As one of Title EIl's avowed purposes is to combat organized crime, see S. REp. No. 1097,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 80, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2157, many
of the crimes for which wiretap authorization may be obtained are those which Congress
determined to be most related to the endeavors of organized crime, including murder, kidnap,
bribery, extortion, bribery of public officials or witnesses, bribery in sporting contests, obstructing criminal investigations, racketeering, counterfeiting, narcotics violations, and loansharking. 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)(b)-(f) (1970).
Title III specifically excepts certain surveillance from its substantive and procedural
provisions. Section 2511(2)(a)-(b), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)-(b) (1970), exempts activities of
employees of communications, common carriers and the Federal Communications Commission. Additionally, under § 2511(2)(c)-(d), 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c)-(d) (1970), consensual
interceptions neither tortious nor criminal in nature made by private citizens or persons acting under color of law are exempted. For an in-depth study of Title III and the consent
exception, see Fishman, The Interceptionof Communications Without a Court Order: Title
III, Consent, and the Expectation of Privacy, 51 ST. JoHiN's L. REv. 41 (1976). The Chief
Executive's power to protect national security by means of electronic surveillance is also
without Title mI's proscriptive ambit. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3) (1970). See also United States v.
United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 94,
reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2182.
Prior to any interception, an order from a judge of competent jurisdiction must be
obtained by filing an application which sets forth with particularity the identity of the official
seeking the order, a full description of the crime and individuals involved, and a statement
that other investigative procedures have been tried and have proved unsuccessful or too
dangerous. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(a)-(e)(1970). Before the order is issued, a judge must make a
determination that probable cause exists to justify the interception. Id. § 2518(3)(a)-(d). The
order must specify the identity of the person whose conversation is to be intercepted, the
location of the interception, the type of communication to be intercepted, the identity of the
agent authorized to effect the interception, and the period for which interception is authorized. Id. § 2518(4)(a)-(e). The statute also provides that once the evidence sought is obtained,
NEws 2112, 2153 wherein it is stated: "Title
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tion to the requirement of prior authorization, section 2517(5) of
Title I provides that evidence of an offense not specified in the
original order which is intercepted during the course of a legal interception may be admitted in a criminal proceeding if authorized by
a subsequent judicial order. 5 Recently, in United States v.
Masciarelli,Ithe Second Circuit held such subsequent authorization
was implicitly granted where the judge who issued the original wiretap order was fully apprised of the reception of evidence relating to
an unspecified offense by a progress report7 and thereafter approved
continuation of the wiretap.'
In Masciarelli,the F.B.I. had obtained an order from a district
court judge permitting a wiretap on a telephone used by the defendant, Masciarelli, who was suspected of conducting a gambling
business in violation of both New York and federal law.9 The order
authorized interceptions of communications relating to the operation of an illegal gambling business for a period of 15 days and
required the government to submit interim progress reports on the
fifth and tenth days of surveillance." Among the numerous calls
intercepted 1 was one between Masciarelli in New York and defendant Schultz in Ohio. During this conversation, Masciarelli agreed
to purchase information from Schultz which could be used to establish "point spreads" in sports betting.12 A description of this conversation was included in the fifth-day report to the district judge, who
the interception is to be discontinued. In no event may the interception last longer than 30
days, although unlimited extensions may be granted. Id. § 2518(5).
5 Id. § 2517(5). Intercepted communications relating to a crime unspecified in the wiretap order may be admitted at a trial or grand jury proceeding "when authorized or approved
by a judge of competent jurisdiction where such judge finds on subsequent application that
the contents were otherwise intercepted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
Such application shall be made as soon as practicable." Id.
558 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1977).
7 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1970), provides:
Whenever an order authorizing interception is entered pursuant to this chapter, the order may require reports to be made to the judge who issued the order
showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objective and the need for continued interception. Such reports shall be made at such
intervals as the judge may require.
558 F.2d at 1069.
18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) prohibits illegal gambling businesses which
violate state law, involve more than four persons, and have been in operation for at least 31
days or generate revenue of $2000.00 in any one day. Article 225 of New York's Penal Law
makes it illegal to operate a gambling business or lottery in New York. N.Y. PENAL LAW 99
225.00-.40 (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1977-1978).
" 558 F.2d at 1065; see note 7 supra.
In its fifth-day report, the government reported that of the 283 calls intercepted, 275
were related to the gambling business violations. 558 F.2d at 1065.
12 Id.
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authorized the wiretap to continue. At the conclusion of the investigation, tapes of all intercepted calls were presented to a federal
grand jury. Masciarelli and nine others were indicted for operating
a gambling business,1 3 and, on the basis of their New York-Ohio
conversation, Masciarelli and Schultz were charged in a separate
indictment with interstate transmission of wagering information. 4
Both Masciarelli and Schultz moved to suppress the interstate
conversation" and dismiss the transmitting-gambling-information
indictment"5 on the ground that interceptions of evidence relating
to this offense were not specified in the original wiretap order. It was
urged that the government's failure to timely secure from the district court judge express authorization to utilize the conversation in
a prosecution for the unspecified crime rendered the evidence inadmissible under section 2517(5)."7 Finding that the filing of the fifthday report followed by the authorization to continue surveillance
did not constitute approval within the meaning of 2517(5), the district court dismissed the indictment.1 8
Id. at 1065-66.
i Id. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (1970) provides:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses
a wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on
any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication
which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers,
or for information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both.
11When disclosure of information intercepted would be in violation of Title I, no part
of that information or evidence derived therefrom may be admitted "in any trial, hearing, or
other proceeding in or before any court [or] grand jury. . . ." Id. § 2515. If the communication is obtained illegally or without proper authorization, an "aggrieved person" may move
to suppress the contents of that interception. Id. § 2518(10)(a)(i). In United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974), the Supreme Court held that for suppression to result it is not
necessary that the interception be unconstitutional; intercepted information will be suppressed "where there is failure to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and
substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures
..
"Id. at 527.
18 Where illegally obtained information is presented to a grand jury which hands down
an indictment, a motion to dismiss the indictment will often be granted. See United States
v. Tane, 329 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1964) (indictment of union official based on testimony
derived from unlawful wiretap dismissed); United States v. Guglielmo, 245 F. Supp. 534, 536
(N.D. Ill. 1965), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Dote, 371 F.2d 176 (7th Cir. 1966) (evidence
based on illegal wiretap held inadmissible and gambling indictment dismissed).
11558 F.2d at 1066.
Is Id. Although stating that he would have held differently had he been "writing on a
clean slate," id., District Court Judge Port indicated his belief that the decisions in United
States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1976), and United States v. Brodson, 528 F.2d 214
(7th Cir. 1975), required that the indictment be dismissed. Both cases held that where
evidence of an unspecified offense is intercepted, subsequent judicial approval must be ob'3
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The Second Circuit reversed and reinstated the indictment,
holding that the judicial authorization required by section 2517(5)
was implicitly granted when the lower court judge authorized the
continuation of the wiretap after having read the government's
fifth-day report.19 Judge Mansfield, who authored the unanimous
opinion, noted that where evidence of an unspecified offense is intercepted during an authorized wiretap, the admissibility of this evidence is dependent on the government obtaining judicial approval
under section 2517(5). Such approval may be granted upon "a showing that the original order was lawfully obtained, that it was sought
in good faith and not as subterfuge search, and that the communication was in fact incidentally intercepted during the course of a lawfully executed order."20 The court found that probable cause for and
the good faith of the initial order were firmly established by the
existence of a large number of intercepted conversations which related to the gambling-business offense specified in the interception
order. 21 Additionally, the fact that the challenged conversation was
probative of the gambling-operation violation indicated to the court
that the original order was not obtained as a pretext. 22 Relying upon
its earlier decision in United States v. Tortorello,23 which found
implied approval based upon renewal and amendment applications
filed with the issuing judge,2 4 the Second Circuit determined that
express approval is not the sole means of obtaining 2517(5) authorization; 25 as the Tortorello court stated, "[l~t is enough that notification of the interception of evidence not authorized by the original
order be clearly provided in the renewal and amendment application papers.

'2

Analogizing the government's progress report to the

renewal and amendment papers presented in Tortorello, Judge
Mansfield concluded that the filing of the progress report, coupled
with the district court's subsequent approval of further wiretapping,
amounted to an implied authorization under section 2517(5).
tained pursuant to § 2517(5), despite the similarity of the unspecified offense to the offense
named in the original order. See United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d at 706; United States v.
Brodson, 528 F.2d at 216.
1g558 F.2d at 1069.
21 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 100, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2112, 2189.
21 558 F.2d at 1068.
2 Id.
2' 480 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
'1 480 F.2d at 783.
2 558 F.2d at 1068.
26 480 F.2d at 783.
21 558 F.2d at 1068.
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In enacting Title III, Congress was aware of the serious constitutional questions raised by wiretapping and electronic surveillance,18 and fashioned the carefully circumscribed procedures enuUntil the enactment of Title I,neither Congress nor the Supreme Court had dealt
comprehensively with the fourth amendment problems presented by wiretapping and electronic surveillance. The Supreme Court was first presented with the issue in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928). There the Court held that governmental wiretapping is
not a "search and seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment, reasoning that no
physical intrusion into a private place is necessary to secure intercepted information. Id. at
464-66. Justice Brandeis argued in his dissent, however, that it is irrelevant that there is no
physical trespass or tangible articles seized, since the protection guaranteed by the fourth
amendment is broad enough in scope to cover any governmental interference with the individual's right of privacy. Id. at 478-79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Partly in response to Olmstead,
Congress enacted § 605 of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934),
which provides in part that "no person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
21

meaning of such intercepted communication to any person . .

. ."

47 U.S.C. § 605 (1970).

In Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937), the Court recognized that evidence intercepted in violation of § 605 is inadmissible in the federal courts. The decision was not based
on constitutional grounds but on the Supreme Court's supervisory powers over the federal
courts. Id. at 383. The Nardone Court held that § 605 mandates suppression of not only direct
evidence, but also of evidence obtained from investigatory leads secured through wiretapping.
Section 605 was later held to prohibit interception of intrastate as well as interstate communications. Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939). In Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199
(1952), it was held that although it is a federal crime for state officers to divulge wiretap
evidence, § 605 does not prohibit the admission of such evidence in a state criminal proceeding. Id. at 203. Evidence obtained by state law enforcement officials under the auspices of
state law and in violation of § 605, however, was held inadmissible in a federal criminal
proceeding. Id.
Similar issues were raised in the electronic surveillance cases presented to the Supreme
Court. As in Olmstead, the Court in Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), found
that since there was no physical trespass committed by placing a "detectaphone" against an
office wall, there was no violation of fourth amendment rights. The same rationale was
adhered to in On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952), in which it was held that there
was no trespass and hence no constitutional violation where a federal agent concealed a small
tape recorder under his clothes and engaged the defendant in an incriminating conversation.
An actual trespass was found in Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961), where a
"spike mike" was inserted into the heating duct of defendant's apartment in order to overhear
defendant's conversations. Although the Silverman Court expressly refused to reconsider the
Goldman decision, it emphasized that its "decision. . .[did] not turn upon the technicality
of a trespass ...as a matter of local law. It [was] based upon the reality of an actual
intrusion into a constitutionally protectected area." Id. at 512. In so holding, the Court seems
to have impliedly acknowledged that an intangible such as a conversation could be seized
within the meaning of the Constitution. Shortly after Silverman, in Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), verbal statements were expressly recognized as seizable items:
"[tihe exclusionary rule has traditionally barred from trial physical, tangible materials
obtained either during or as a direct result of an unlawful invasion. It follows from our holding
in Silverman v. United States, . . . that the Fourth Amendment may protect against the
overhearing of verbal statements as well as against the more traditional seizure of 'papers and
effects.' "Id. at 485 (citation omitted). Despite the departure from Olmstead evident in Wong
Sun, the Court reaffirmed the trespass doctrine in Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427
(1963), holding that "[tihe Court has in the past sustained instances of 'electronic eavesdropping' against constitutional challenge, when devices have been used to enable govern-
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merated therein to meet the standards established by the Supreme
2
Court.

Section 2517(5) specifies in detail the manner in which

intercepted conversations may be employed and the means of obtaining the subsequent judicial approval to use incidentally intercepted information evidencing an offense not enumerated in the
wiretap authorization." It is submitted that the Second Circuit's
holding in Masciarellimisapplied the implicit-authorization rationale articulated in Tortorello; in so doing, the court seems to have
rendered a decision inconsistent with both the express wording of
section 2517(5) and its underlying congressional intent.
In Tortorello, an order authorizing a wiretap on defendant's
telephone was issued, based on a finding that there existed probable
cause to believe that the defendant was committing various state
ment agents to overhear conversations . . . .It has been insisted only that the electronic
device not be planted by an unlawful physical invasion of a constiutitionally protected area."
Id. at 438-39 (citations omitted). The concept that there could be no fourth amendment
violation unless there was a physical trespass into a protected area was finally laid to rest in
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See note 29 infra.
" The decisions in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), prescribed the requirements that must be satisfied before an interception
of a wire or oral communication will be deemed constitutional. The Court in Berger was
presented with the question of the constitutional validity of the New York wiretapping statute, ch. 924, § 813-a, [19421 N.Y. Laws 2030 (repealed 1968). Using the language in Berger
as a guide, Congress delineated the following factors as necessary to render a wiretapping
statute constitutional:
(1) Particularity in describing the place to be searched and the person or thing
to be seized.
(2) Particularity in describing the crime that has been, is being, or is about to
be committed.
(3) Particularity in describing the type of conversation sought.
(4) Limitations on the officer executing the eavesdrop order which would (a)
prevent his searching unauthorized areas, and (b) prevent further searching once
the property sought is found.
(5) Probable cause in seeking to renew the eavesdrop order.
(6) Dispatch in executing the eavesdrop order.
(7) Requirement that the executing officer make a return on the order showing
what was seized.
(8) A showing of exigent circumstances in order to overcome the defect of not
giving prior notice.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 100, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
2112, 2161-62. Although the Court laid down a stringent standard against which eavesdropping procedures must be measured, it did not directly deal with the problem of the trespass
doctrine enunciated in United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), and Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), discussed in note 28 supra, since the case involved a
nontrespassory intrusion. In Katz, however, the Court specifically overruled both Olmstead
and Goldman concluding that "once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects
people-and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear
that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical
intrusion into any given enclosure." 389 U.S. at 353.
11See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970).
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offenses.' This order was renewed or extended five subsequent
times. Accompanying each application for renewal were affidavits
setting forth the progress of the investigation and giving a daily
summary of the intercepted calls. During the course of the surveillance, evidence of a securities fraud violation was incidentally intercepted.32 The securities fraud conversation was fully detailed in the
next affidavit submitted in support of renewal of the wiretap, and
the order approving the renewal incorporated by reference this affidavit.3 The Second Circuit held that by approving the renewal of
the wiretap, the lower court judge had implicitly authorized, under
section 2517(5), the use of the incidentally intercepted evidence to
establish the securities fraud conviction.3 4 The Tortorello court
found that from the supporting affidavits it could be determined
that the original application was made in good faith and not as a
pretext for uncovering evidence of the securities offense. In addition,
the Second Circuit noted that the affidavit in support of renewal
expressly stated that the conversation in issue related to a possible
securities violation.3 5 Reasoning that Title III does not require a
judge to make an in-court pronouncement that evidence of a crime
unspecified in the original order had been properly obtained, and
that a "judge presumably will scrutinize any application and will
scrupulously impose the restrictions required by statute,"36 the
Tortorello court concluded that the filing of the renewal and amendment application papers, followed by the actual renewal of the wiretap, constituted sufficient compliance with the statute. 7
Unlike Tortorello, where the district court judge was informed
of the incidental interception in a renewal application, the conversation relating to the unspecified offense was brought to the judge's
attention in Masciarellivia a progress report.3 8 The statutory func-

tion of these two instruments differs considerably. While a renewal
or extension application might be an appropriate vehicle for obtaining implicit authorization under section 2517(5), it is suggested that
a progress report is inappropriate as a means of obtaining such
approval. Extension applications must satisfy the same procedural

11480 F.2d at 770.
32 Id. at 771.
11

Id. at 782.

34 Id.

35Id.
13Id. at 783.
3 Id.
21558 F.2d at 1065.
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requirements as requests for original wiretap orders,39 procedures
established to meet the fourth amendment's requirements of probable cause and particularity. 0 The progress report, on the other hand,
must be filed only when the issuing judge in his discretion so directs,
and functions in an entirely different manner.4 1 The language of
Title I furnishes only a sketchy indication of the progress report's
use,4 2 but the legislative history specifies that the function of these
reports, when required, is to ensure that the minimization requirements of the statute are followed, i.e., that the interception is not
carried on for longer than is necessary to obtain evidence of the
specified offense.13 Progress reports thus serve "as a check on the
continuing need to conduct the surveillance" during the period of
the original order.44
In considering an extension application, a judge is compelled to
scrutinize it carefully in order to make the requisite findings of
probable cause. 5 Where the judge determines that probable cause
continues to exist and grants the extension, inherent in that determination, it is submitted, is a finding that the original application
was made in good faith and that any intercepted conversation evidencing a crime unspecified in the original order was incidentally
and properly intercepted. Consequently, an implied authorization
based on an extension order, as found in Tortorello,45 would seem
to satisfy the 2517(5) requirement of subsequent judicial approval.
No such judicial scrutiny is necessary when a progress report is
filed. 7 The court need only casually read the report in order to
assess the progress of the investigation and determine whether sur"'

See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1970); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 103, reprinted

in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2192.
11During the Senate debates on Title III, it was argued that a new showing of probable
cause for an extension of the wiretap order is necessary to prevent the intrusion from becoming a general search in violation of the fourth amendment. 114 CONG. REC. 14, 486 (1968).
" The notion of a progress report seems to stem from the concern expressed in Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), with respect to judicial oversight of on-going wiretaps. See id.
at 57. One author has suggested that if progress reports were made mandatory, they would
act as an added safeguard ensuring active judicial supervision over the intercept process.
Linzer, FederalProcedurefor Court Ordered Electronic Surveillance: Does it Meet the Standards of Berger and Katz, 60 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 203, 212 (1969).
See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) (1970), quoted in note 7 supra.
'3 See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 104, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2112, 2193.
IId.

See United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 782 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866
(1973); accord, United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 687 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
934 (1972).
" 480 F.2d at 781-83.
' See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
"
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veillance should continue for the remaining period of the original
order.18 Since Title Ill does not require any findings as a prerequisite
to approval of such a continuance, it would seem strained to premise
a 2517(5) authorization, which requires findings of good faith and
probable cause," upon that approval.
Section 2517(5) clearly indicates that an application for authorization under that section must be made." As in the case of a traditional search warrant, a Title III application, whether it be for renewal or an original order, must be supported by oath or affirmation.51 Thus, it is upon the basis of the information culled from an
affidavit that a judge makes his determination of probable cause.2
Affidavits need not, however, accompany a progress report; 53 the
report merely summarizes the intercepted calls to apprise the judge
of the tenor of the investigation. 4 It would appear anomalous to
conclude that the application requirement of section 2517(5) could
be satisfied by anything less than what is required to support a
renewal or original application; nothing in either the legislative history or the statute suggests that affidavits need not be filed in support of a section 2517(5) application. Therefore, as an independent
ground for not basing a 2517(5) authorization upon a progress re4,See id.
'

See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 100, reprintedin [19681 U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws 2112, 2189.

5' See 18 U.S.C. § 2517(5) (1970); S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 100, reprinted
in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2189.
51Title III provides in pertinent part: "Each application for an order authorizing...
the interception of a. . . communication shall be made in writing upon oath or affirmation
." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1) (1970).
52 As a warrant issued under Title I must be supported by statements made under oath
or affirmation giving rise to an inference of probable cause, it is the affidavit, a sworn written
instrument, which provides the basis for the issuance of the warrant. The Supreme Court in
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), expressly indicated that an affidavit, particular in
its recitation of facts, would form the basis for a determination of probable cause under a
constitutional wiretapping statute. Id. at 57.
1 The legislative history of Title III is devoid of any indication that a sworn statement
such as an affidavit is required under § 2518(5). See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
104, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2193, wherein it is merely stated
that an "order may require reports to be made to the judge ....

"

(emphasis added).

See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
In its discussion of § 2517(5), the legislative history indicates that the application
necessary for § 2517(5) approval must make a "showing" that the original order was requested
in good faith rather than as a pretext and that the evidence sought to be admitted was
incidentally intercepted. S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 100, reprintedin [1968] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2112, 2189. While § 2517(5) does not employ express language
indicating that an oath or affirmation is required, it is submitted that in order to promote
statutory consistency and curtail abuses the requisite "showing" must be supported by a
sworn statement setting forth facts from which a judge might make a proper determination
as to the admissibility of 2517(5) evidence. See note 64 infra.
"
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port, it is submitted that the authorization should not be granted
in the absence of an application accompanied by affidavits, as the
statute arguably requires.
Electronic surveillance, unlike conventional searches in which
seizure is limited to specifically identified items, "is a quest for
something which may happen in the future.""6 As a result, electronic
surveillance, by its nature, comes into conflict with the fourth
amendment requirement that a warrant describe with particularity
"the things to be seized. ' ' s5 Nevertheless, in enacting Title III,

-longress has attempted to comply with the fourth amendment's
dictates by imposing various safeguards, including extensive judicial oversight. 58 Throughout the history of its fourth amendment
decisions, the Supreme Court has been steadfast in its insistence
that a warrant not be issued in the absence of judicial scrutiny. 9 In
the realm of wiretapping, Supreme Court decisions have emphasized not only the need for particularity with regard to electronic
surveillance orders, but also this requirement of antecedent judicial
approval. 0 Yet, section 2517(5) embodies neither of these requirements.6 Although it may perhaps be sustained" by analogy to the
51Spritzer, Electronic Surveillance by Leave of the Magistrate: The Case in Opposition,
118 U. PA. L. Rav. 169, 189 (1969).
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV. As one commentator has noted:
It is doubtful. . . that a court order authorizing electronic eavesdropping can
comply with the "warrant clause" of the fourth amendment. The provision of the
warrant clause which seems to defy compliance is the requirement that a search
warrant must particularly describe the "things to be seized." A specific description
of the conversation to be "seized" in the future is impossible since the words have
not yet come into existence . . . . Due to the nature of electronic eavesdropping,
it seems apparent that a court order cannot meet the particularization requirement
of the warrant clause ....
Note, The Constitutionality of Electronic Eavesdropping, 18 S.C.L. REv. 835, 837 (1966)
(footnotes omitted).
-" In enacting Title I, Congress clearly intended that the statute meet constitutional
standards as enunciated by the Supreme Court. See S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.
71, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2112, 2163. For decisions upholding
Title III in the face of a constitutional challenge, see United States v. Kirk, 534 F.2d 1262
(8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ramsey, 503 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
932 (1975); United States v. Martinez, 498 F.2d 464 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1056
(1974).
11 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 96 (1964); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 464 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
See note 29 supra.
, It should be noted that the constitutionality of § 2517(5) has been upheld by some
federal courts. See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 687 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp. 296, 307-08 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd,
506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 300-01 (S.D. Fla.
1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th Cir.
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"plain-view" exception to the warrant requirement, 3 section
2517(5) thus treads on sensitive constitutional ground. 4 It is sub1972). But see Schwartz, The Legitimation of Electronic Eavesdropping:The Politicsof "Law
and Order," 67 MICH. L. REv. 455, 465 (1968); Note, EavesdroppingProvisions of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968: How do they Stand in Light of Recent
Supreme Court Decisions?, 3 VAL. L. REv. 89, 94 (1968). Professor Schwartz has argued that
§ 2517(5) disregards the thrust of Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927), in
which the Court stated that "[t]he requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the
things to be seized makes general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure
of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to
the discretion of the officer executing the warrant." Schwartz, supra, at 465. While Professor
Schwartz cited United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859
(1962) and Johnson v. United States, 293 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
888 (1963), as examples of lower federal courts ignoring the import of Marron,both these cases
employed the "plain-view" doctrine to uphold the seizure of evidence without a search warrant. The plain-view doctrine, however, if properly applied, is not inconsistent with Marron.
See note 63 infra.
62 The Supreme Court has not as yet directly upheld the constitutionality of Title I. It
has had occasion, however, to interpret various provisions of the statute. See, e.g., United
States v. Donovan, 97 S. Ct. 658 (1977) (§ 2518(8)(d) does not mandate service of discretionary notice); United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (§ 2516(1) authorizes only
Attorney General or his assistant to issue wiretap orders); United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S.
143 (1974) (§ 2518(1)(b)(iv) requires order to name only known users of the target telephone
participating in the intercepted conversation).
Although the fourth amendment requires that a warrant describe with particularly the
items to be seized, courts over the years have fashioned exceptions which recognize that the
practicalities of effective law enforcement require some flexibility. The plain-view doctrine
is one such exception. Under this theory, evidence not specified in a warrant may nevertheless
be admitted if three requirements are met. The evidence seized must have been in open-view
and not concealed. Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968). That the evidence was
in plain view is not in and of itself enough, however, to justify seizure. Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948). Seizure is only proper where the law enforcement agent had a
legal right to be in a position to view the seized item. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 466 (1971); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 153 (1947). In addition, the
discovery of the evidence must be inadvertent. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
466 (1971).
The plain-view doctrine is applicable in several situations. Where the police are operating under a valid warrant and inadvertently discover incriminating evidence, that evidence
may be admissible under the doctrine. See United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932);
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Steele v. United States, 267
U.S. 498 (1925). Plain-view evidence is admissible if discovered by police in "'hot pursuit'
of a fleeing suspect." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). In addition, evidence in plain
view during a search incident to a valid arrest may properly be seized. See Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). Finally, evidence discovered through pure inadvertence is admissible. See Harris v. United States, 390
U.S. 234 (1968). It is important to note that a plain-view seizure cannot disintegrate into the
kind of general search proscribed under the fourth amendment, see, e.g., Marron v. United
States, 275 U.S. 192, 195-96 (1927); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886),
because it is limited to those objects which come into plain view as a result of the initial valid
intrusion. Thus, no proper plain-view seizures can be made while an officer is exceeding the
scope of a warrant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467-70 (1971).
64 While the plain-view analogy has been invoked as a basis for upholding the constitutionality of § 2517(5), see United States v. Sklaroff, 323 F. Supp 296, 307 (S.D. Fla. 1971),
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mitted, therefore, that this provision should be interpreted strictly
in accordance with its language and accompanying legislative history."1
aff'd, 506 F.2d 837 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Escandar, 319 F. Supp. 295, 300-01 (S.D.
Fla. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Robinson, 468 F.2d 189 (5th
Cir. 1972), it is an imperfect analogy at best. A traditional search warrant describes with
particularity the items to be seized and thereby limits the scope of the intrusion. It is this
initial limitation that distinguishes a plain-view seizure from a general search. See Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). Once a law enforcement agent exceeds the
limitations established by the warrant, he cannot properly make any plain-view seizures.
The wiretap warrant on the other hand, can never describe with particularity the conversation to be seized. It is impossible to give a "specific description of the conversation to be
'seized' in the future. . .since the words have not yet come into existence.
... Note, The
Constitutionalityof Electronic Eavesdropping, 18 S.C.L. REv. 835, 837 (1966). The wiretap
warrant, therefore, authorizes a much broader search, giving the eavesdropper far more latitude in effecting seizures under the traditional plain-view doctrine.
Of equally grave social if not constitutional importance is the nature of the seized item.
Under the historical plain-view approach, the things seized were tangible property. In the
wiretapping area, however, it is thoughts and conversations that are intercepted. A Congressional awareness of the sensitivity of this type of search is evidenced in the legislative history
of Title III:
The tremendous scientific . . . developments that have taken place ..
have
made possible . . . the widespread use and abuse of electronic surveillance techniques . . . . [P]rivacy of communication is seriously jeopardized. . . . No longer
is it possible . . . for each man to retreat into his home and be left alone. Every
spoken word relating to each man's personal, mental, religious, political or commercial concerns can be intercepted by an unseen auditor and turned against the
speaker to the auditor's advantage.
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 67, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2112, 2154.
Balanced against these constitutional and social concerns is the notion that the state
should not be prevented from using information inadvertently obtained to prosecute or prevent crimes. Cognizant of these conflicting principles, Congress, in providing for admission
of § 2517(5) evidence, attempted to codify the plain-view doctrine in a manner which would
provide maximum protection to the individual, i.e., by requiring subsequent judicial approval
to use inadvertently intercepted evidence. Strict compliance with the requirements of §
2517(5), therefore, appears to be the best way to ensure as close adherence to fourth amendment requirements as is practicable. Clark, Wiretappingand the Constitution,5 CALIF. W.L.
REv. 1, 6 (1968).
" In United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit hesitantly
applied the Tortorello rationale noting
that such implicit authorization procedures are susceptible to possible uncertainty
as they are reviewed for their consonance with § 2517(5).
We would hope, therefore, in view of the clear dictates of our ruling in this case,
that in the future law enforcement officials will as a matter of prudence seek to
secure explicit approval of such incidental interceptions. Such efforts should not
be unduly burdensome . . . particularly where the issuing judge has been made
aware of the results of the surveillance operation while it is still in progress.
Id. at 707-08 n.21. Other circuits have expressed a similar concern. See, e.g., United States
v. Brodson, 528 F.2d 214, 216 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Moore, 513 F.2d 485, 502-03
(D.C. Cir. 1975); United States v. Cox, 449 F.2d 679, 687 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 934 (1972); In re United States, 427 F.2d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 1970).
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In finding implicit approval on the basis of information brought
to light in a progress report, the Second Circuit in Masciarelliseems
to have overlooked the constitutionally sensitive nature of section
2517(5) and misconstrued the nature and import of the progress
report. As an informal, unsworn document from which no specific
judicial findings need be drawn, the report seems inappropriate as
a basis for subsequent court approval under section 2517(5). By
analogizing a progress report to the renewal and amendment applications which served as the foundation for the Tortorello implicitauthorization rationale, it is submitted that the Masciarelli court
has unwisely extended the Tortorello holding. It is hoped that the
Second Circuit will reevaluate the Masciarelliholding and opt for a
position more consistent with Title I's procedural requirements,
which were designed to ensure, to the extent possible, individual
freedom from unwarranted intrusion.
ChristinKunz Martell

